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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This note offers a review and analysis of the range of existing legal instruments for gender 
quotas on management boards.   
 
It starts with a summary review of the range of voluntary and legal mechanisms to narrow 
the gender gap in representation on corporate management boards, before moving on to 
focus on legal instruments. 
 
It describes and discusses the variations between legal instruments in the companies 
targeted, the proportion of each gender to be represented, the timetable for 
implementation, the sanctions utilised, and the legal regime. 
 
The target companies include those that are larger rather than smaller, and those that are 
state owned and publicly listed on the stock exchange rather than those that are privately 
owned and not listed. 
 
The minimum proportion of each gender to be represented on the board is most frequently 
set at 40%, though there is a range from 30% to 40% in the EU. 
 
There is phasing over time of implementation in most cases, with a warning period before 
the use of sanctions.  In addition there is sometimes a phased increase in the minimum 
proportion of each gender to be represented. 
 
The sanctions utilized vary significantly, including: the de-listing of the company, the 
annulment of board appointees, fines, loss of priority for government contracts, and a 
requirement to explain why the company did not comply. 
 
More than one legal regime, or type of law, has been used, including both company law and 
employment law.  There is variation in the extent to which the wider public interest is 
included within the legal justification for the introduction of the law.  There are parallels 
with the use of quotas to achieve gender balance in political processes linked to elections to 
Parliamentary seats, where there is a clear public interest in gender balanced 
representation.  The public interest is included in some instances of Company law.  If the 
governance of companies is seen as a matter of the public interest, then there is greater 
justification for the use of quotas than if corporate boards are seen as a matter of private 
interests only.   
 
Quotas on corporate boards have been justified on at least three grounds: justice (for 
women whose merit should earn them a place on boards), improved company performance 
(the use of the skills of women as well as of men), and democracy (the wider public 
interest).  These three grounds are variously embedded in different legal regimes.  The 
justice ground has more often been invoked through employment law, which allows for 
positive action when there are equally qualified women and men.  Improved company 
performance and the wider public interest are more often invoked in company law, which 
determines the characteristics of corporate boards and hence permits quotas. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Parliament and the European Commission have proposed legislative action to 
narrow the gender gap in corporate management boards.  There is a specific proposal from 
the Commission to introduce a Directive to improve the gender balance among non-
executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges.  This note is intended to inform 
the ongoing debate on this proposal for a Directive. 
 
There is a wide range of both voluntary and legal mechanisms to narrow the gender gap in 
representation on management boards.  These are briefly reviewed before moving on to 
focus on legal mechanisms.  This draws on the work presented in Walby and Armstrong 
(2012). 
 
There is a range of forms of legal instruments within the Member States of the EU and 
other Members of the European Economic Area to narrow the gender gap in the 
membership of corporate management boards. EU Member States that have enacted laws 
to introduce gender quotas on corporate management boards include: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (Davies, 2011; EC 
Network, 2011; Pande and Forde, 2011; Visser, 2011; Lombardo, 2012).  Outside of the EU 
there are examples of legislation in: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Israel.   
 
This note describes the differences in the type of companies that are targeted by 
legislation, the minimum proportion of each gender that is to be represented on the board, 
the timetable and phasing of the implementation of the law, the range of sanctions that can 
be applied within the legislation and the type of legal regime that is deployed.  The note 
analyses the nature and implications of the different forms of quota legislation.  There are 
further forms of legislative intervention that may have indirect effects on the gender 
composition of corporate boards, but these are outside the scope of this note. 
 
Section 2.1 introduces the range of voluntary and legal mechanisms.  Section 2.2 offers a 
summary of the different legal mechanisms.  Section 2.3 discusses the range of companies 
targeted, including by size and by ownership.  Section 2.4 discusses the proportion of each 
gender to be represented.  Section 2.5 discusses the use of delays and phasing during the 
implementation period.   Section 2.6 discusses the sanctions that have been applied.  
Section 3 offers a discussion of the nature and implications of the wider legal regime within 
which the quota laws are located. 
 
2. MAIN ASPECTS OF THE DIFFERENT LEGAL MECHANISMS 
 2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The narrowing of the gender gap on corporate management boards has been addressed in 
debates on quotas as important for company performance (to ensure that companies 
access the best talent in order to improve the performance of their businesses) (McKinsey 
and Company, 2007), for justice (for women whose merit should earn them a place on 
boards), and for democracy (there is a public interest in good governance and in gender-
balance in economic decision-making) (Storvik and Teigen, 2010).  
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A wide repertoire of both voluntary and legal mechanisms has been used in attempts to 
narrow the gender gap in representation on management boards (Visser, 2011; Walby and 
Armstrong, 2012).   
 
Voluntary mechanisms include good practices at different levels: in companies; within an 
industry sector; and industry as a whole.  Leading examples good practices include: 
 
 Training, mentoring and sponsor programmes, which assist in the development of 
female talent; 
 
 Industry awards and prizes, which encourage and reward innovative practices by 
companies;  
 
 Data bases of women interested in and qualified to sit on boards, so as to make it 
easier for companies to find ‘Board-ready’ women; 
 
 Codes of practice for industry self-regulation, which provide guidelines for good 
practice, and insist on reporting on progress towards these, on a basis of ‘comply or 
explain’. 
 
Compulsory mechanisms use legislation to enforce compliance.  They use some forms of 
‘quota’ for the proportion of the least represented gender on the board. 
 
The effectiveness of both voluntary and legal mechanisms has been widely reviewed 
(Warth, 2009; Austrian Institute, 2010; Fagan et al, 2011; Hoel, 2008; Storvik and Teigen, 
2010; Visser, 2011; Walby and Armstrong, 2012).  The conclusion found in most reviews is 
that while voluntary mechanisms can have measureable effects, these are uneven and 
slow, and that legal quotas are the most successful mechanism to narrow the gender gap in 
corporate boards (Walby and Armstrong, 2012). For example, Visser (2011: 10) finds that 
progress on gender equality in economic decision-making has been ‘glacially slow’.  The 
only mechanism that has so far led to women constituting 40% of the membership of 
corporate boards is that of legal compulsion.  Despite years of effort in the form voluntary 
initiatives in Norway, it was only with the implementation of a law with strong sanctions 
that rapid progress was achieved (Rasmussen and Huse, 2011). An impact assessment by 
the European Commission accompanying the recast Capital Requirements Directive reports 
on changes in board membership in countries implementing gender quotas and comments: 
‘If the goal is to accelerate the numbers of women on Boards in a short period of time, the 
figures… tend to show the effectiveness of legislated quotas in increasing the numbers of 
women directors’ (European Commission, 2011c: 158). 
 
The effectiveness of legal compulsion does not necessarily mean that voluntary 
mechanisms are irrelevant.  Most of the countries that have introduced legal compulsion 
have done so alongside a variety of voluntary measures.  The conclusion of the evaluations 
appears to be that while legal compulsion is the only method that has achieved the 
presence of women on management boards at the level of 40%, the additional use of 
voluntary mechanisms can be valuable. 
 
A commonly held view is that voluntary means should be tried first, but that if they fail to 
narrow the gap, then quotas should be used.  For example, in the UK, the Davies (2011: 2) 
report recommended that: ‘Government must reserve the right to introduce more 
prescriptive alternatives if the recommended business-led approach does not achieve 
significant change’.    
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A range of international bodies has considered the issue of quotas.  For example, the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2011), in Resolution 1825 ‘More women in 
economic and social decision-making bodies’, stated that ‘a balanced representation of 
women and men at all hierarchical levels, including top management, is a matter of justice, 
respect for human rights and good governance’. The text added that such representation 
was conducive to productivity and profitability. The Assembly considered quotas positively, 
believing that the experience of quotas in the political arena could be transposed into the 
private sector and socio-economic domain. The Resolution included a call for member 
states to: 
7.11. adopt legislation requiring that public and private institutions achieve a minimum 
40% representation of women in management and decision-making positions within a 
clearly defined time frame, and put in place the necessary mechanisms for monitoring the 
implementation of such legislation; 
7.12. introduce the obligation for state-owned and large private companies to guarantee a 
minimum 40% representation of women on their governing and management boards; 
And for member states to encourage companies, firms and associations in the private and 
voluntary sector to: 
8.5. introduce rules aimed at ensuring balanced representation of women and men in top 
management and decision-making bodies, guaranteeing a minimum 40% representation of 
women on governing and supervisory boards. 
 
2.2 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS (QUOTAS) TO NARROW THE GENDER GAP 
IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT BOARDS IN EU MEMBER STATES  
 
Country 
(Year 
introduced) 
Companies 
targeted 
Proportion of 
minority 
gender to be  
represented 
Timetable for 
implementation  
Sanctions for 
non-
compliance 
Austria (2011)  Companies 
owned 50%+ by 
state. 
 
2 phases: 
 
25% 
 
35% 
2 phases: 
 
2013 
 
2018 
No sanctions. 
Belgium 
(2011) 
 
Phased timing by 
company legal 
status: 
 
 
State-owned 
companies  
 
Listed companies 
 
Small and 
medium sized 
listed 
companies; 
companies with 
less than 50% 
shares listed. 
1/3 Phased timing by 
company legal 
status: 
 
 
2012 
 
 
2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018 
Temporary loss 
of financial and 
non-financial 
benefits by 
board 
members. 
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Denmark 
(2000) 
State-owned 
companies. 
30% Immediate  
Finland (2004) State-owned 
companies. 
40% 2005  
France (2011) 
 
Listed 
companies; 
companies with 
500+ employees 
or 
turnover/asset of 
€50m+. 
2 phases: 
20% 
 
40% 
2 phases: 
2013 
 
2016 
Annulment of 
board 
appointments. 
Ireland (2004) State-owned 
companies. 
40% No deadline  
Italy (2011) 
 
Listed 
companies; 
companies with 
public 
participation and 
state-ownership. 
 
2 phases: 
20% 
 
33% 
2 phases: 
2012 
 
2015 
Admonishment 
by regulatory 
body (Consob); 
fine; annulment 
of board. 
Netherlands 
(2010) 
 
All companies 
(regardless of 
listing, 
ownership, 
private/public) 
with 250+ 
employees (or 
turnover 
criteria). 
30% in boards 
and senior 
management 
2016 No sanctions in 
law. Comply or 
explain in 
annual report 
and publish 
action plan to 
address. 
Spain (2007) 
 
Public limited 
companies with 
250+ 
employees. 
40% 2015 No penalties; 
incentive: 
potential 
priority status 
for government 
contracts.  
Sources1  
  
2.3 COMPANIES TARGETED 
 
In most cases there are limitations on the type of company targeted by the legislation.  
There are two main variations: the size of the company; and the type of ownership of the 
company.   
2.3.1 The size of the company. 
                                                 
1 Davies, Lord (2011), Women on Boards. Pp 22-3; European Commission’s Network to Promote Women in 
Decision-making in Politics and the Economy (2011), ‘The Quota-instrument: Different approaches across Europe. 
Working Paper’. Annex 2; Lombardo, E. (2012), ‘Gender quotas in corporate boards: Italy and Spain’.  Note for 
research team; Pande, R. and Ford, D. (2011), ‘Gender Quotas and Female Leadership’. World Development 
Report 2012, Gender Equality and Development, Background Paper. World Bank. Table 3; Visser, M. (2011), 
‘Advancing gender equality in economic decision-making’, European Conference on Equality between Women and 
Men Brussels, September 19-20, 2011. Annex 2.    
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In some countries, small, or small and medium sized, firms are exempted from the 
legislation. This is the case in: Belgium (small and medium sized), France (less than 500 
employees; turnover/asset of less than €50m), Spain (less than 250 employees), and the 
Netherlands (less than 250 employees).   
 
2.3.2 The ownership of the company. 
 
In some countries, private companies are exempted and the legislation applies only to state 
owned companies. There are variations as to where the boundary is drawn in firms that are 
part-state owned. There are variations as to whether the legislation applies only to those 
private companies that are publicly listed on the stock exchange, or whether non-listed 
firms (e.g. family firms, private equity) are included as well. In some cases the legislation 
is applied first to state owned companies, and later to private companies.  
 
The legislation applies as follows: Austria (50%+ state owned), Belgium (state-owned 
companies, listed companies), Denmark (state owned), Finland (state owned), France 
(listed companies), Ireland (state owned), Italy (state owned and listed companies), the 
Netherlands (all), Spain (listed companies).  
2.4 PROPORTION OF EACH GENDER TO BE REPRESENTED  
 
The proportion of the less well represented gender that must be eventually represented on 
the board varies between 30% and 40% in EU Member States, with the most common 
proportion being 40% and the second most common being 30%. In some cases a lower 
proportion is introduced first, followed by a higher proportion later.  The target is usually 
described in this gender neutral way, rather than referring specifically to women.  
 
In the EU the highest proportion was 40% in Finland, Ireland and Spain. Outside of the EU, 
it was 50% in the 2006 Icelandic legislation (though 40% in the later legislation in 2010). 
 
Among the laws that have used a single level (to be directly reached once the law enters 
into force) one can find: 
- 40% in Finland, Ireland and Spain. The same level was used in Norway with a detailed 
specification for smaller boards (if 2 or 3 members, then there should be 1 of each gender; 
if 4 or 5 members, at least 2 of each; if 6-8 at least 3 of each; if 9 or more then 40%).   
- 33% in Belgium. 
- 30% in Denmark and the Netherlands. 
 
Dual levels, with the lower first, the higher later, were used by: Austria (25%, then 35%), 
France (20%, then 40%) and Italy (20%, then 33%). 
 
2.5 TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
 
There are three types of variations in the timetable for implementation.   
 
First, in almost all cases companies were given a period of time to achieve a higher 
proportion of the less represented gender before they were subject to sanctions.  This 
waiting period varied in length and the extent of activity by the government in encouraging 
firms to comply, including the threat of invoking sanctions.  The only exception was 
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Denmark (legislation only applies to state owned companies) where implementation was to 
be immediate. 
 
Second, in some countries there was a phased implementation using a lower threshold first 
and a higher one later. This was the case in: Austria, France and Italy (as above). 
 
Third, in some countries there was a complex phased process with some kinds of 
companies given a longer period of time to implement the increased proportion than other 
kinds.  For example, in Belgium, state-owned companies were required to implement the 
one-third quota by 2012; larger publicly listed companies by 2016; while small and medium 
sized listed companies and also companies with less than 50% of their shares listed, were 
given until 2018.   
 
There was sometimes a complex mix of phased application, waiting periods and threats to 
apply sanctions. For example, in the case of Norway, the law initially applied to all publicly 
listed companies and to state owned and inter-municipal companies, and was later 
extended to all municipal companies. Companies had 5 years, until January 2008, to 
comply (though new companies formed after 2006 had to comply from the start).  The Act 
contained a clause that if the companies increased the proportion of the minority gender to 
the required level of 40% by 2005 the Act would not come into effect, but this did not 
happen (Teigen 2011).  In January 2008, 77 companies (out of about 450) in breach 
received warning letters from the Bronnoysund Registration Center giving them 4 weeks to 
comply; in February 12 companies got a second letter; in April 2008 all were in compliance 
(Storvik and Teigen 2010). 
 
The timetabling of implementation of a Directive is relevant to the concern that has been 
expressed that the proposed Directive does not meet the requirements of subsidiarity. The 
assessment by the UK House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union (House of 
Lords, 2012) suggests that the voluntary measures taking place at the national level are 
successfully raising the proportion of women, so the burden of implementation of the 
proposal would cause disproportionate administrative burdens and is not justified under the 
principle of subsidiarity. The frequent use of a waiting period before the sanctions provided 
for in the legislation come into effect means that voluntary methods have usually been 
given an opportunity to be effective before compulsion is applied. 
 
In almost all instances of quota legislation, the use of legal compulsion only took place after 
a period of time, usually of several years duration, had been allowed for voluntary means 
to be attempted and was only implemented after voluntary means had failed to achieve 
their target. 
 
2.6 SANCTIONS 
 
In the different national legislation, there is a range of types of sanctions in the case of 
non-compliance.  These include:  
 annulment of board appointments (France);  
 temporary loss of financial and non-financial benefits by board members (Belgium);  
 admonishment by regulatory body, fine, annulment of board (Italy); 
 no penalties; but an incentive in potential priority status for government contracts 
(Spain) 
 no sanctions; requirement to ‘comply or explain’ in their annual report and to 
publish an action plan to address the issue (the Netherlands).  
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The staging of the process of the application of the sanctions is a further source of 
variance.  For example, in the case of Italy, if there is non-compliance, the first step is that 
Consob, the official body that regulates the stock market, would advise the company to 
restructure its board; if after four months nothing happens, then the company will be fined 
an amount between 100,000 and 1 million Euros; if after three months there is still no 
compliance, the board and its elected members are annulled (Lombardo, 2012).   
 
The variation in the sanctions is partly due to variations in the form of legal regime used in 
the legislation. The use of company law includes the possibility of strong sanctions such as 
de-listing thereby closing the company and the annulment of board appointments that do 
not comply, although it can also be used to invoke ‘softer’ responses, such as merely the 
requirement to ‘comply or explain’.  The use of employment law has usually meant less 
severe penalties, such as fines. 
3. EMPLOYMENT LAW, PUBLIC REPRESENTATION AND 
COMPANY LAW 
 
Equality between women and men is one of the EU’s founding values and this aim is 
embedded in Article 2 and 3(3) of the Treaty of the European Union.  In different legal 
regimes, there are variations in the way that concepts of equality, quotas and positive 
discrimination are understood and applied. There are variations in the use of employment 
law or of company law as the relevant legal regime to regulate company boards in Europe, 
which have implications for the legitimacy of quotas.  The proposed EU Directive draws on 
employment law.  The successful application of quotas in Norway used company law.  This 
section discusses employment law and company law in the EU. 
 
The legal regime in EU and Member States that concerns issues of equality and quotas is 
different in the field of employment from that in the fields of public representation and 
company law.  In employment, the principle of equal treatment is held, though with some 
occasional use of quotas.  In the field of public and political representation, quotas are 
frequently used (as, for example, in France2).  The legal context and national legal 
frameworks may have implications for the introduction of quotas on corporate boards, for 
example, the French legislation on corporate boards was delayed by discussion of the 
constitutionality of affirmative action before quotas were enacted in January 2011 (Leelere 
and Paddock, 2011).3 If the non-executive directors of corporate boards have features that 
belong to public representation and company law rather than employment, then there is a 
stronger basis for the use of quotas.     
 
The EU legislates for equal treatment in employment, but permits the use of quotas in 
some circumstances: 
                                                 
2 Loi n° 2000-493 du 6 juin 2000 tendant à favoriser l'égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux mandats 
électoraux et fonctions électives 
3 European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, workshop on positive action, annual 
conference, 4 October 2011, notes a forthcoming report on positive action (including company boards) by Selanec 
and Senden. 
See Burri, S. (2011) ‘Discussion Paper, Workshop 1, Positive Action’ Available at: 
http://www.non-discrimination.net/content/media/Positive%20Action%20-%20discussion%20paper.pdf  
The concept of positive action is also discussed in: Burri, S. and Prechal, S. (2008) EU Gender Equality Law, 
Available at: http://www.jafnretti.is/D10/_Files/Evr%C3%B3pul%C3%B6g.pdf  and Fredman, S. (2009) Making 
Equality Effective: the Role of Proactive Measures. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/makingequalityeffectivefinal2009_en.pdf 
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- Article 157 TFEU states: “With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men 
and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member 
State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to 
make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.”   
- Within EU employment law, positive discrimination towards the least represented group is 
sometimes allowed in the case of equally qualified candidates.  An example can be found in 
the UK, where Section 159 of the 2010 Equality Act allows employers to select someone 
from an under-represented group when faced with two candidates of equal merit. This has 
been described as a ‘tie-breaker’ concept of positive discrimination, which can be 
contrasted to that of a ‘threshold’ form (Noon, 2012).   
- At the point of intersection of EU immigration law and employment law, the ‘threshold’ 
form of discrimination is allowed, which permits an EU citizen that has reached a threshold 
level of qualification to be appointed in preference to a non-EU citizen that might be better 
qualified4.  
 
Within public and political representation in EU Member States, quotas are widely used.  
They take a variety of forms, including voluntary political party quotas and legislated 
quotas for candidates for election to national parliaments.  Most EU Member States have 
voluntary party quotas, including: Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  Some EU Member States have legislated quotas for 
candidates for election to national parliaments: Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.  Almost all Member States have either voluntary party quotas 
or legislated candidate quotas (Denmark is an exception) (International IDEA, 2010). 
 
Company law offers a different legal basis for gender quotas on corporate boards than that 
of employment law.  This relates to the public duties of these boards.  The proposals for 
narrowing the gender gap in the membership of corporate boards have usually concerned 
the non-executive directors, rather than the executive directors.  Executive directors are 
employed full-time (usually) to run the companies. Non-executive directors have a 
supervisory function, to ensure that a company is properly run, but not to actually run it.  
Most companies are limited liability companies, meaning that shareholders are not 
personally liable if the company is not able to pay its debts.  Shareholders in a limited 
liability company are privileged in not being personally responsible for the debts of the 
company, if the company should fail. This privilege is given by Parliament to shareholders.  
Non-executive directors have a responsibility to the public as well as to the share-holders 
to ensure that a company is properly run.  Regulation of the form and gendering of the 
governance of corporate boards would be an explicit recognition of the public duty aspects 
of board responsibility. 
 
Company law increasingly recognises the interests of the wider public as well as that of 
owners.  The company is given duties and responsibilities that are wider than the 
immediate interests of shareholders. This may be considered either a balance between two 
sets of competing interests (owners and public), or an articulation of the complementary 
nature of the interests of the long-term interests of the company and the interests of the 
public (Cameron McKenna, 2007).  This latter interpretation has been conceptualised as 
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value’ (Medhurst, 2008). For example, the UK Company Act 2006 
imposes a duty on directors to ‘have regard to the impact of the company’s operations on 
the community and the environment’ (s.172 1 d).  Section 172 (1) of this Act states: ‘172 
                                                 
4 Thanks to Daniel Muzio, Jenny Tomlinson and David Sugarman for discussions on this point. 
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Duty to promote the success of the company: (1) A director of a company must act in the 
way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst 
other matters) to— (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the 
interests of the company’s employees, (c) the need to foster the company’s business 
relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the company’s 
operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act 
fairly as between members of the company.  (2) Where or to the extent that the purposes 
of the company consist of or include purposes other than the benefit of its members.’5  
Further, Company law can regulate the nature and composition of Company Boards.  For 
example, the UK Companies Act 2006, Part 10, Chapter 1, lists prescriptions for Directors 
of a UK Company, including the number of Directors and their minimum age (UK 
Companies Act 2006). 
 
The aim of equality between women and men, a founding value of the EU embedded in the 
Treaty of the European Union, can be applied to corporate boards using either or both of 
employment law and company law.  Employment law allows for positive action for equally 
qualified female candidates in contexts where women are under-represented, unless there 
are exceptional circumstances.  Company law allows for quotas on corporate boards on the 
grounds of both the effective running of the company for its shareholders and of its wider 
duties to the public.  In practice, the use of quotas to implement the principle of gender 
equality is most widely found in public bodies and parliamentary politics, with most EU 
member states using quotas either in political parties or in national legislatures.  When 
public decision-making is the focus, quotas are widely used to achieve gender balance.   
 
The conclusion drawn here is that the legal principle that is most likely to be effective in the 
achievement of gender balance in economic decision-making, on corporate boards, is one 
that invokes the public interest, not only private interests.  The development of legislative 
mechanisms to achieve 40% of each gender on corporate boards may be more effectively 
achieved via company law than employment law insofar as company law embeds the 
principle of public interest in economic governance to a greater extent than does 
employment law. 
                                                 
5 Thanks to David Sugarman for drawing my attention to this Article. 
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ANNEX: LEGAL INSTRUMENTS (QUOTAS) TO NARROW THE 
GENDER GAP IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT BOARDS IN 
OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 
 
Country (Year 
introduced) 
Companies 
targeted 
Proportion of 
minority 
gender to be 
represented 
Timetable for 
implementation  
Sanctions for 
non-
compliance 
Iceland (2006) State-owned 
and municipal-
owned 
companies. 
 
50% (or as 
close as 
possible) 
Immediate  
Iceland (2010) Public and 
private limited 
companies with 
50+ employees. 
 
40% 2013  
Israel (1993) State-owned 
companies. 
 
30% No deadline  
Norway (2003)  
 
Public limited 
companies; 
state-owned 
companies; 
inter-municipal 
companies. 
 
40% 2008 Official warning; 
fines; ultimate 
delisting and 
dissolution. 
Switzerland 
(2006)  
State-owned 
companies. 
30% 2011  
 
Note: Iceland and Norway are members of the European Economic Area, to which the proposed 
Directive will be applicable, following a decision of the EEA Joint Committee.  
 

